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DUTY OR FAITH?: THE EVOLUTION OF PAKISTANI RAPE 
LAWS AND POSSIBILITY FOR NON-DOMESTIC REDRESS 
FOR VICTIMS 
ABSTRACT 
For years in Pakistan, the tragic story began and ended the same for all 
Pakistani women: with a tragic rape and the victim being brought to shame or 
murdered for a violation of Islamic law. Pakistan, which had historically based 
its laws surrounding rape and the punishment for the crime on Islamic beliefs, 
failed to provide adequate relief for its victims. The Islamic laws were histori-
cally biased against women placing a high burden on the victim to support her 
allegations. Rather than attempting, and possibly failing to prove their allega-
tions, many victims instead hid their shame simply out of fear. 
The classic story appeared to take a turn in 2006 with the passing of the 
Protection of Women Act. The media praised the Act as “historic” and de-
scribed it as a positive move towards secularism. The passing of the law 
seemed to signify a change in the Islamic culture and finally an avenue for 
which rape victims could seek relief. However, the implementation of the Act 
alleged to protect women did much less in the way of women’s rights than the 
name would suggest.  
In response, this Comment criticizes the adoption of the new law and dis-
putes the claim that the Protection of Women Act did anything to effectively 
overturn the Islamic-based ordinances previously put in place to prosecute 
rape in Pakistan. In particular, this Comment asserts that the new law fails in 
its implementation to provide any form of relief to victims of rape and instead 
has been used as a superficial tool to alleviate the negative image associated 
with the previous strict adherence to Islamic laws. Next, this Comment argues 
that due to the persistent and ongoing failure of the country to provide relief to 
rape victims, the women of Pakistan should be able to obtain justice through 
other means.  
The possible avenues through which Pakistani rape victims could seek re-
lief are limited to a small number of venues outside of the domestic court sys-
tem, namely through international tribunals for violations of international hu-
man rights law, by way of a domestic transitional justice system, or through a 
non-domestic court system where individuals could attempt to sue heads of 
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state. However, the likelihood of success through any one of those avenues ap-
pears to be small. Ultimately, the greatest chance for the vindication of rape 
victims wanting to successfully bring their claim lies in the possible impact of 
international pressure on the Pakistani government. As attitudes towards 
women and gender stereotypes continue to change and become more progres-
sive, there is a chance that Pakistani woman could be afforded redress through 
their own legal system as a result of international admonishment. 
INTRODUCTION 
The fat man was reeling, and he laughed out loud on seeing me. Then 
they closed the door and one man dragged me to the table by the 
hair. The fat policeman fell on top of me. I started screaming and 
struggling. I got up and ran around inside the room with one man 
hurtling me toward the other, grabbing me now by my hair, now by 
my breasts. My shirt tore from the middle. Then the fat man 
overpowered me, and in the presence of those two other beasts, 
satisfied himself of me. I felt like I was going to die.1 
Khurshid Begum, a poor washerwoman from Pakistan, describes the 
chilling series of events leading to her rape in a Pakistani police station.2 
Begum’s crime was no more than one of association: a punishment for being 
married to a political activist.3 Begum was returning home from visiting her 
husband, who had been jailed for an allegation regarding the State’s national 
security.4 On the night of November 13, 1991, “she was grabbed . . . 
blindfolded, and thrown into a car ‘like a bag of trash’ by some policemen.”5 
After her rape, contrary to the support and love one would expect to 
overwhelm a victim of rape, Begum’s family distanced themselves.6 She was 
told by her brother-in-law to “commit suicide,” and described her own family 
as “‘wanting her blood.’”7 Begum did not even believe that her husband would 
accept her after the incident.8 
 
 1 Shahla Haeri, Hermeneutics and Honor: Rape in Pakistan, in NEGOTIATING FEMALE “PUBLIC” SPACE 
IN ISLAMIC/ATE SOCIETIES 59–60 (Asma Afsaruddin ed., 1999). 
 2 Id. at 59. 
 3 Id. at 60. 
 4 Id. at 59. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 60. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
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Unfortunately, for years in Pakistan, this tragic story began and ended the 
same for all Pakistani women: with a tragic rape and the victim being brought 
to shame or murdered for a violation of Islamic law.9 Pakistan, which had 
historically based its laws surrounding rape and the punishment for the crime 
on Islamic beliefs, has failed to provide adequate relief for its victims.10 The 
Islamic laws were historically biased against women, placing a high burden on 
the victim to support her allegations.11 Rather than attempting, and possibly 
failing to prove their allegations, many victims instead hid their shame simply 
out of fear.12 
The classic story appeared to take a turn in 2006 with the passing into law 
of the Protection of Women Act (PWA).13 The “media praised the [Act] as 
‘historic’ and described it as a positive move towards secularism.”14 The 
passing of the law seemed to signify a change in the Islamic culture and finally 
an avenue for which rape victims could seek relief.15 However, the 
implementation of the laws alleged to protect women did much less in the way 
of women’s rights than the name of the Act would suggest. 
This Comment criticizes the adaptation of the new law and disputes the 
claim that the PWA did anything to effectively overturn the Islamic-based 
ordinances previously put in place to prosecute rape in Pakistan. In particular, 
this Comment asserts that the new law fails in its implementation to provide 
any form of relief to victims of rape and instead has been used as a superficial 
tool to alleviate the negative image associated with the previous strict 
adherence to Islamic laws. Next, this Comment argues that due to the 
persistent and ongoing failure of the country to provide relief to rape victims, 
the women of Pakistan should be able to obtain justice through other means. In 
analyzing how these women will obtain justice, this Comment first determines 
the possible international obligations Pakistan has failed to adhere to by not 
 
 9 Rachel Bubb, Reform of the Pakistani Rape Law: A Move Forward or Backward?, 11 J. GENDER RACE 
& JUST. 67, 67 (2007). See generally MUKHTAR MAI WITH MARIE-THÉRÈSE CUNY, IN THE NAME OF HONOR 1, 
7 (Linda Coverdale trans., 2006) (describing Mukhtar Mai’s experience of being sentenced to gang rape for 
her brother’s crimes and subsequent shame, suicidal thoughts, and expectation that she would be killed in an 
honor killing). 
 10 Bubb, supra note 9, at 67; see also Vilani Peiris, Musharraf’s Reform of Pakistan’s Rape Law—A 
Cynical Manoeuvre, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Jan. 24, 2007), http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2007/01/ 
paki-j24.html. See generally MAI, supra note 9. 
 11 Peiris, supra note 10. 
 12 Bubb, supra note 9, at 73; see also Haeri, supra note 1, at 65. 
 13 Peiris, supra note 10. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See id. 
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effectively prosecuting rape crimes. The Comment then expands on possible 
international sanctions against Pakistan for failure to abide by international 
conventions. The analysis continues by exploring the possibility of either 
applying international pressure to force compliance from Pakistan or 
developing a domestic transitional justice system to prosecute rape crimes in 
Pakistan. Finally, this Comment considers the possibility that Pakistani women 
may bring their charges of rape through a non-domestic court system. 
In support of these arguments, this Comment is divided into five parts. Part 
I details the development and implementation of the Hudood Ordinances and 
addresses the difficulty that the Zina Ordinance in particular created for 
Pakistani women who alleged rape. Part II focuses on the law as it stands now 
after the implementation of the PWA in 2006. Specifically, this Part critiques 
the PWA for its failure to prosecute crimes of rape and provide redress for 
Pakistani women. In Part III, this Comment (1) proposes the idea that 
Pakistan’s consistent failure to effectively investigate and provide redress for 
women who have been raped is a violation of both international human rights 
law and the country’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and (2) explores the possibility that the country 
might be subject to international sanctions. In Part IV, this Comment explores 
the possibility and likely success of applying international pressure to persuade 
Pakistan to adapt how they conduct rape investigations. Further, Part IV 
discusses the possibility of success if Pakistani rape victims brought their 
claims through both a transitional justice system and the United States (U.S.) 
federal court system through the Alien Tort Claims Act, addressing possible 
difficulties with both. Finally, Part V summarizes the arguments and presents 
conclusions. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 
As a nation immersed in the Islamic faith, Pakistan adapted its laws in 
conformity with its religious beliefs.16 Majid Khadduri, a famed scholar of 
Islamic law, wrote, “Islamic law is the epitome of the Islamic spirit, the most 
typical manifestation of the Islamic way of life, the kernel of Islam itself.”17 It 
is due to that “spirit” that the Islamic faith has played such a prominent role in 
the development of the laws in Pakistan and, despite its reversal, continues to 
 
 16 Bubb, supra note 9, at 68–70. 
 17 See 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW 28 (Majid Khadduri & 
Herbert J. Liebesny eds., 1955). 
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frame the judgments of the court and legal system.18 This Part begins by first 
explaining the previous legal framework under the Hudood Ordinances 
specifically in regards to crime of Zina and the impact that those laws had on 
the prosecution of rape in Pakistan. 
A. Sharia Law 
The word Sharia, while simplified in English to mean Islamic law, carries a 
much more sentimental meaning among those of the Muslim faith.19 Muslims 
consider Sharia to be a sort of “ultimate justice” delivered by God himself.20 
Sharia was derived from two predominate sources: one being the Qur’an and 
the other being the sunna, the life example of the prophet Mohammad.21 In a 
process called ijtihad, Muslim legal scholars created Sharia by studying the 
text of the Qur’an and the sunna to form an interpretation of what they 
understood to be God’s law.22 These interpretations were then written into 
doctrinal rules of the Islamic faith referred to as fiqh.23 
Inevitably, the process of ijtihad led to multiple interpretations even among 
likeminded scholars.24 However, with the ijtihad process being accepted as 
“inherently human,” rather than choosing one interpretation over another, all 
fiqh conclusions qualify as Sharia if they are the result of a sincere 
commitment to the process.25 These varieties of interpretations thus created 
multiple acceptable schools of law, each being recognized as valid for Muslims 
living by Sharia.26 One scholar described the paradox of the multiple fiqh 
interpretations by stating, “[t]he distinction reflects the reality that every fiqh 
rule . . . is a human-created approximation of sharia, but there may very well 
be an equally legitimate alternative fiqh rule on the same issue.”27 This paradox 
became one of the primary issues in Pakistan as the Hudood Ordinance 
implemented its own fiqh into the Pakistani Criminal Code. 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 Asifa Quraishi, What If Sharia Weren’t the Enemy?: Rethinking International Women’s Rights 
Advocacy on Islamic Law, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 173, 203 (2011). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 204. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
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B. Implementation of the Hudood Ordinance 
 Pakistan gained its independence from British rule in 1947.28 Through the 
course of developing its laws, three constitutions were written: one in 1956, 
one in 1962, and one in 1973.29 While the language of the constitutions 
changed, a clear trend existed as each version brought the laws closer and 
closer to the Islamic faith.30 For example, unlike the Constitution of 1947, the 
Constitutions of 1962 and 1973 both called for the commission of a Council of 
Islamic Ideology to bring the existing laws into conformity with the Islamic 
faith.31 Legislation dating back to British rule, such as “The Muslim Personal 
Law of 1937” and “The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939,” both 
of which focused on a strict adherence to the Muslim faith, were used to 
govern the creation of each new constitution.32 
While on its face the original Constitution of 1962 was in conformity with 
the Islamic faith,33 the implementation and punishment for certain offenses, 
including rape, were still handled by the Pakistani Criminal Code.34 It was not 
until the 1977 regime of General Zia-ul Haq that adherence to Islamic law 
became mandated.35 Zia took a stricter stance than any previous leader in an 
attempt to inject the Islamic faith into the Pakistani Criminal Code in a 
movement often referred to as “Islamization.”36 Thus, the Hudood Ordinances 
were established, birthing a set of laws calling for a strict adherence to Sharia. 
C. The Zina Ordinance 
Chapter 24, verse 2 of the Qur’an defines and proscribes punishment for 
the crime of Zina as: 
“The woman and the man 
Guilty of adultery or fornication 
Flog each of them 
 
 28 Rahat Imran, Legal Injustices: The Zina Hudood Ordinance of Pakistan and Its Implications for 
Women, 7 J. INT’L WOMEN’S STUD. 78, 79 (2005). 
 29 Bubb, supra note 9, at 69.  
 30 Id. 
 31 Shahnaz Khan, Locating the Feminist Voice: The Debate on the Zina Ordinance, in PAKISTANI 
WOMEN 140, 141 (Sadaf Ahmad ed., 2010) [hereinafter S. Khan, Locating the Feminist Voice]. 
 32 Imran, supra note 28, at 79. 
 33 Bubb, supra note 9, at 69. 
 34 PAK. PENAL CODE, XLV of 1860, pmbl.; see also Bubb, supra note 9, at 75.  
 35 Imran, supra note 28, at 79. 
 36 Id. 
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With a hundred stripes . . . .”37 
With the implementation of the Zina Ordinance into the Hudood, this verse 
of the Qur’an was interpreted to conflate adultery and fornication.38 Legal 
scholars interpreted the passage to punish those people who engaged in sex 
who were not married with “one hundred stripes,” while those who engaged in 
adultery were to be stoned to death.39 Thus, with the implementation of the 
Zina Ordinance, illicit sex became a crime that was “non-compoundable, non-
bailable, and punishable by death” for the first time in Pakistan’s history.40 
Whereas adultery and illicit sex in Pakistan had previously been considered a 
“crime” personal to only husbands and fathers, with the implementation of the 
Hudood, the crime became an offense to the State.41 As both a non-
compoundable and non-bailable offense, individuals charged with Zina could 
not have a complaint dropped against them and were not eligible for release 
without bond pending trial.42 
The offense of Zina became a frequently alleged crime under the Hudood 
Ordinance,43 more likely than not due to its broad interpretation. Though the 
Zina Ordinance prosecuted illicit sex, it made no criminal distinction between 
sexual acts if those engaging in it were unmarried; thus fornication, adultery, 
and rape were all held to the same standard under the Ordinance.44 While the 
term Zina referred to sexual intercourse engaged in while the person was not 
legally married, the term “Zina-bil-jaber” was used to refer to intercourse 
without being validly married when it occurs without consent.45 Thus, under 
the law, if coercion could not be proven, the victim became an offender guilty 
of Zina.46 
Under Sharia, there are two categories of punishment with which to 
penalize those guilty of Zina: hadd and ta’zir. The difference between the two 
 
 37 A. YUSUF ALI, THE HOLY QUR’ĀN: TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 896 (A. Yusuf Ali trans., 1983) 
(citing verse 24:2 of the Qur’an).  
 38 Id.; see also S. Khan, Locating the Feminist Voice, supra note 31, at 141.  
 39 S. Khan, Locating the Feminist Voice, supra note 31, at 141. 
 40 Id. 
 41 SHAHNAZ KHAN, ZINA, TRANSNATIONAL FEMINISM AND THE MORAL REGULATION OF PAKISTANI 
WOMEN 8 (2006) [hereinafter S. KHAN, ZINA]. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id.; see also S. Khan, Locating the Feminist Voice, supra note 31, at 147. 
 44 S. KHAN, ZINA, supra note 41, at 8. 
 45 The Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood), No. 7 of 1979, PAK. CODE (ed. 1979), ¶ 6(1)(b) 
[hereinafter Zina Ordinance]. The text of the Ordinance can be found in The All Pakistan Legal Decisions 
[P.L.D.] 1979 Cent. Statutes 51 (Pak.).  
 46 S. KHAN, ZINA, supra note 41, at 9. 
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punishments is based on their relation to the Qur’an, with hadd offenses 
derived from Islam and ta’zir offenses created by the legislature.47 
Traditionally, Zina was an offense liable to hadd, or the maximum sentence.48 
The punishment for Zina under hadd was death;49 however, the high 
evidentiary burden made conviction under hadd both uncommon and 
unlikely.50 In order to successfully prove a hadd offense, provided the accused 
is Muslim, he could confess, or the victim could produce four males of good 
moral standing who had witnessed the actual penetration.51 In fact, despite the 
frequency with which Zina was alleged, no punishment had ever been 
administered under hadd.52 If a victim could not meet the evidentiary standard 
for seeking justice under hadd, then her only remaining option was to try and 
seek redress through ta’zir punishments.53 Ta’zir punishments were much less 
severe and varied depending on the identity of the accused. For adultery and 
fornication, the ta’zir punishment was up to ten years in prison, thirty lashes 
with a whip, and a fine.54 The ta’zir punishment for rape was up to twenty-five 
years in prison and thirty lashes.55 
D. Problems Inherent in the Zina Ordinances 
“The Zina Ordinance is an extremely oppressive, controversial, and 
contested piece of legislation in Pakistan.”56 A major contention of the Zina 
Ordinance is its inherent bias against women.57 Basing the Pakistani Criminal 
Code on the Qur’an, which has frequently been criticized for its gender-
discriminatory nature, creates room for any interpretation of the religious 
document to possibly condone or even endorse violence towards women.58 In 
specific passages the Qur’an goes so far as to label women as the “property” of 
men, using religious grounds as its justification: 
 
 47 Julie Dror Chadbourne, Never Wear Your Shoes After Midnight: Legal Trends Under the Pakistan 
Zina Ordinance, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 179, 185 n.16 (1999). 
 48 See Zina Ordinance, supra note 45, ¶ 5(1); S. KHAN, ZINA, supra note 41, at 8.  
 49 Zina Ordinance, supra note 45, ¶ 6(3). 
 50 See id. ¶ 5; Chadbourne, supra note 47, at 185 nn.16–17.  
 51 See Chadbourne, supra note 47, at 185 nn.16–17; Bubb, supra note 9, at 71–72, S. KHAN, ZINA, supra 
note 41, at 8–9. 
 52 S. KHAN, ZINA, supra note 41, at 9.  
 53 Bubb, supra note 9, at 72. 
 54 S. KHAN, ZINA, supra note 41, at 9.  
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 15. 
 57 See Imran, supra note 28, at 87. 
 58 See id.  
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Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because God has 
given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they 
support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are 
devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband’s) absence what God 
would have them guard. 
As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct, 
admonish them (first), (next), refuse to share their beds, (and last) 
beat them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, seek not against 
them means (of annoyance): for God is Most High Great (above you 
all).59 
Under the guidance of passages such as this, Sharia does not attempt to hide its 
discrimination against women; because of the discretion given to legal scholars 
in the process of ijtihad,60 fiqh interpretations have enabled the laws to be 
taken a step further to protect men to the detriment of women’s rights.61 
This protective male framework becomes most evident with respect to the 
Zina Ordinance in terms of its classification and prosecution of rape. The most 
egregious flaw of the Zina Ordinance lies in its failure to distinguish between 
consensual and non-consensual intercourse.62 While evidentiary standards 
under ta’zir were less stringent than those under hadd, women who reported 
rape put themselves in a difficult and often self-incriminating position.63 The 
victims of rape who brought claims under the Zina Ordinance were admitting 
that Zina had taken place.64 Thus, if they failed to provide enough evidence to 
convict their attacker, they and they alone could be charged with the crime of 
Zina (as was more often the case than not) because the victim alone was 
admitting to sexual intercourse.65 The deep disparity between the sentencing of 
women as compared to men for Zina spoke volumes about the gender bias 
inherent in the prosecution of the Zina Ordinance;66 a law that inherently 
required participation by two people in a heterosexual relationship but was 
only prosecuted against women.67 As a result, up to ninety percent of the 
reported rape victims who brought their claims to the State were imprisoned 
 
 59 ALI, supra note 37, at 190–91 (citing verse 4:34 of the Qur’an). 
 60 Quraishi, supra note 19, at 203–04. 
 61 See id. at 214–15.  
 62 See Imran, supra note 28, at 78 n.2. 
 63 See Michael F. Polk, Women Persecuted Under Islamic Law: The Zina Ordinance in Pakistan as a 
Basis for Asylum Claims in the United States, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 379, 384 (1998). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 S. KHAN, ZINA, supra note 41, at 83–84. 
 67 See id. at 84. 
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because they failed to produce credible witnesses to sustain their allegations of 
rape.68 A newsletter published by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 
reported that between forty to fifty percent of the female prisoners were there 
due to Zina-related offenses.69 
In addition to the failure of the law to adequately prosecute rape and the 
disproportionate amount of women incarcerated under the Zina offense, 
women faced different battles when entering into the jurisdiction of the court. 
Women faced the threat of sexual, physical, and emotional violence and 
extortion both when their families accused them of Zina and while under the 
supervision of the law enforcement.70 The U.S. State Department reported that 
at times, Pakistani police were implicated in rape cases either by threatening 
the victim, accepting bribes from the attackers, or actually raping the women 
themselves.71 The U.S. State Department further reported that medical 
personnel “were generally untrained in collection of rape evidence,” and 
women who had been accused of adultery or Zina offenses were forced to 
submit to medical exams “against their will” despite the fact that the law 
required their consent.72 Women interviewed in the prison system often 
admitted that they believed that they were being imprisoned due to violating 
their families’ wishes, and few had any knowledge of the law or the legal 
process.73 With a lack of legal knowledge and an unwavering reliance on legal 
aid, women could face years of incarceration before they were put to trial.74 
Once incarcerated, women were held in “lockup” leading to increased threats 
of abuse, rape, and torture from prison guards.75 
Thus, with attackers receiving impunity for committing rape, it was no 
surprise that under the Zina Ordinance, rape continued in astonishing numbers. 
Reports from human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and 
the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported that “800 cases of rape 
were reported in the national press in 1994; half of them were gang-rapes and 
most of the victims were under-aged girls.”76 It was because of the persistent 
 
 68 Polk, supra note 63, at 384. 
 69 S. KHAN, ZINA, supra note 41, at 84. 
 70 Id. at 85. 
 71 See Pakistan, U.S. DEP’T STATE: BUREAU DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., & LABOR (Mar. 11, 2008), 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100619.htm.  
 72 Id. 
 73 S. KHAN, ZINA, supra note 41, at 85. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Polk, supra note 63, at 384 (internal quotations omitted). 
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threat of rape in combination with the lack of prosecutions and possibility of 
failing to meet the high burden of proof for rape allegations under the Zina 
Ordinance that only one third of rape cases were actually reported to the 
authorities.77 
II. THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN ACT 
A new form of hope came for the women of Pakistan in November 2006 
with the passing of the PWA.78 Among other things, in an effort to protect the 
women of Pakistan, the Act moved rape prosecutions out of the Hudood 
Ordinance and into the Pakistani Criminal Code while simultaneously 
eliminating the eyewitness requirement previously necessitated by the Zina 
Ordinance.79 Immediately after its implementation, the Act was praised as 
“historic” and viewed as “a positive move towards secularism.”80 In time, 
however, the optimistic attitude towards the new Act would prove to be 
misguided, as the actual implementation failed to move either rape prosecution 
or women’s rights away from the previous Sharia ideals. 
A. Overturning the Zina Ordinance 
It was not until national attention was brought to the tragic and violent rape 
of Mukhtar Mai that the Hudood Ordinance caught the attention of both the 
Pakistani community and leaders in the international law community.81 Mai, a 
peasant woman living in the village of Meerwala, Pakistan, was brutally raped 
by four village leaders—a punishment decided on by members of her own 
family.82 Mai’s punishment, a ritual commonly referred to as “honor justice” 
was handed down as a result of her brother’s crime of openly flirting with a 
woman from their village.83 
 
 77 Id.  
 78 See generally The Protection of Women Act, No. 302 of 7646, THE GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN 
EXTRAORDINARY, Dec. 2, 2006. 
 79 See id.; see also Quraishi, supra note 19, at 208–09. 
 80 Peiris, supra note 10. 
 81 Bubb, supra note 9, at 73–74. 
 82 MAI, supra note 9, at 1, 5, 9–10. 
 83 Id. at 8–9, 14 (explaining that Mai’s rape was a way to restore honor in the family after her brother had 
committed a crime). But see Farooq Tirmizi, Mukhtaran Mai: A Story of Extraordinary Courage, EXPRESS 
TRIB. (Apr. 22, 2011), http://tribune.com.pk/story/154316/mukhtaran-mai-a-story-of-extraordinary-courage/ 
(indicating that Mai’s rape was not a sentence handed down but rather an ambush after she was sent to the 
temple in order to apologize for her brother’s actions). 
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Mai’s tragic story became a matter of national news when, six days after 
the rape, the imam of a local mosque spoke out publically against the rape in 
the Friday prayers and invited newspapers and journalists to speak with Mai’s 
family.84 While the majority of honor rapes carried out in manners such as this 
go unreported,85 Mai did something unprecedented when she decided to press 
charges against her rapists.86 The original conviction sentenced the six men 
who had participated in either the ordering or the execution of the rape to 
death; however, an appeals court overturned the conviction, “citing a lack of 
evidence.”87 
Outrage was incited as Mai’s story spread, and as a result, provoked a 
debate questioning both the morality and implementation of the Hudood 
Ordinance in Pakistan.88 The Asia Director of Human Rights Watch, Brad 
Adams, described Mai’s case as “[t]he failure to ensure justice in what by all 
accounts was a straightforward prosecution” and an indication of “the justice 
system’s appalling disregard for women’s rights.”89 Adams’s opinion 
expressed sentiments felt by those around the world as both the domestic and 
international communities began to pressure Pakistani leaders to consider a 
reform to the Zina Ordinance.90 
B. The Protection of Women Act 
President Pervez Musharraf passed the PWA in 2006.91 The Preamble of 
the Act describes its purpose by stating, “[w]hereas it is necessary to provide 
relief and protection to women against misuse and abuse of law and to prevent 
their exploitation.”92 
Among other things, the Act’s main function was to move rape and 
adultery cases out of prosecution under the Hudood Ordinance and back into 
the prosecution under the Pakistani Criminal Code (as it was before the 
 
 84 Tirmizi, supra note 83. 
 85 Catriona Davies, Gang Rape Victim Fights Back for Girls’ Education, CNN (Feb. 21, 2013, 4:48 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/19/world/asia/mukhtar-mai-pakistan-gang-rape/. 
 86 See MAI, supra note 9, at 68–69.  
 87 See Bubb, supra note 9, at 74. 
 88 Id.  
 89 Pakistan: Prevent Injustice for Gang-Rape Victim, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 22, 2011), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/22/pakistan-prevent-injustice-gang-rape-victim. 
 90 Bubb, supra note 9, at 74. 
 91 Rubya Mehdi, The Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 in Pakistan, 59 DROIT 
ET CULTURES 191, ¶ 28 (2010). 
 92 The Protection of Women Act, supra note 78. 
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presidency of General Zia).93 With the addition of the PWA to the Pakistani 
Criminal Code, there appeared to be a clear shift towards secularism in 
expanding women’s rights, particularly in regards to rape.94 
Under the PWA, unlike under the Zina Ordinance, rape is both fully 
defined and prescribed a criminal punishment.95 The Act recognizes rape under 
five circumstances: 
(1) against [a woman’s] will; (2) without [a woman’s] consent; (3) 
with [a woman’s] consent, when the consent has been obtained by 
putting her in fear of death or of hurt; (4) with her consent, when the 
man knows that he is not married to her and that the consent is given 
because she believes that the man is another person to whom she is or 
believes herself to be married; or (5) with or without her consent 
when she is under sixteen years of age.96 
The crime for rape under the Act is punishable by either death or imprisonment 
between ten to twenty-five years.97 This addition of the PWA to the Criminal 
Code was potentially one of the most important factors for those advocating 
for reform. With the PWA now recognizing a variety of circumstances in 
which rape could occur, a victim could no longer be prosecuted for her 
participation in Zina.98 Further, the law prohibits the prosecution of rape 
victims for Zina when the “absence of consent” cannot be proven.99 Though 
consensual fornication is still considered a crime, the Act stipulates that 
allegations of consensual sex must be fully investigated before charges can be 
brought.100 
The Act takes another step away from the Zina Ordinance by effectively 
eliminating the previous evidentiary standard for rape.101 Whereas the Zina 
Ordinance required the testimony of four male witnesses with good moral 
 
 93 See Bubb, supra note 9, at 74–75. 
 94 See Peiris, supra note 10. 
 95 The Protection of Women Act, supra note 78, ¶¶ 375–76. 
 96 Id. ¶ 375. 
 97 Id. ¶ 376. 
 98 See id. ¶¶ 375–76. 
 99 PAK102659.E, Pakistan: The Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 and its 
Implementation, IMMIGR. & REFUGEE BOARD CAN. (Dec. 3, 2007), http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/ResRec/ 
RirRdi/Pages/index.aspx?doc=451609. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Because the PWA moved rape prosecutions to the authority of the Pakistani Criminal Code, the 
previous evidentiary standards necessary under the Zina Ordinance were no longer required. Zina Ordinance, 
supra note 45, ¶ 8. 
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standing who had actually witnessed the penetration,102 the Pakistani Criminal 
Code enables a victim to bring forth credible witnesses of either gender to 
support her claim.103 
C. Problem of Parallel Legal Systems 
Despite the praise and recognition that the Act received from both the 
international community and media outlets,104 the PWA did not drastically 
move Pakistan’s criminal system towards secularism as was previously 
expected.105 The PWA had many inherent flaws as well as battles to persuade a 
culture engrained in the Islamic faith to accept a law that arguably went against 
their belief system. 
One persistent problem with the implementation of the PWA was the 
existence of plural legal systems.106 Pakistan has, over the years, established 
several court systems such as the Federal Shariat Courts and the Shariat 
Appellate Bench, the Special Trial Courts, the Customary Practices and the 
Frontier Crimes of Regulation, and International Human Rights Law all in 
addition to the existence of the State judicial system.107 With all of these legal 
systems recognized under the Pakistani Constitution, each system had equal 
weight in terms of judicial opinion, enabling police to have discretion as to 
which legal system they wanted to bring charges under.108 This created 
confusion as the systems overlapped in jurisdiction, allowing people to be 
punished differently for committing the same crime.109 
In the context of rape, it is no surprise that the ability to prosecute crimes 
under either the Pakistani Criminal Code or the Hudood Ordinance made all of 
the difference to victims. Although the implementation of the PWA created an 
 
 102 Id. 
 103 See PAK. PENAL CODE, supra note 34, § 375; The Protection of Women Act, supra note 78, ¶ 203A; 
see also Mehdi, supra note 91, ¶ 27. After the passage of the PWA, with the removal of rape crimes from the 
Shariat Court to the Pakistani Criminal Court, the requirement of four pious male witnesses was eliminated in 
exchange for the evidentiary requirements of the Penal Code, which are not gender specific as applied to 
witnesses. 
 104 Peiris, supra note 10.  
 105 Id. 
 106 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN ISLAMABAD, STUDY TO ASSESS IMPLEMENTATION OF 
WOMEN PROTECTION ACT 2006, at 11 (2006), http://www.ncsw.gov.pk/prod_images/pub/StudyonWomen 
ProtectionAct2006.pdf. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
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easier system whereby women could bring forth allegations of rape to the 
Pakistani Criminal Court without the same strict evidentiary standards required 
under the Hudood Ordinance,110 because the Shariat courts were still 
recognized as a valid court of law,111 the Zina Ordinance was still a very real 
threat looming over rape victims’ heads. The standard for rape prosecution 
remained unchanged and, as of June 2014, there had been zero rape 
convictions in the country for the previous six years.112 
The PWA was also widely criticized for its implementation in a historically 
patriarchal society.113 “Because of gender biases at the personal level, there is 
not a genuine acceptance of the PWA amongst the police and the judiciary.”114 
In a society traditionally run by males, a bill that sought to protect women for 
crimes that were punishable under Islamic law created many reservations 
among members of the judiciary.115 One repercussion of societal disapproval 
of the PWA was an increase in the incidents of honor killings.116 Whereas 
under the Hudood Ordinance people were able to rectify the shame brought 
upon the family of a rape victim by simply accusing them of Zina, under the 
protection of the PWA there was no longer a legal remedy to punish crimes 
dealing with violations of honor.117 As a result, families began to take matters 
into their own hands, leading to a spike in the number of honor killings.118 
Finally, even with the implementation of the PWA, Pakistan did nothing to 
reform the investigative methods associated with cases of sexual assault.119 
Since the PWA was enacted, the investigative methods have not been adapted 
to implement a program that establishes a standard procedure for dealing with 
victims of sexual crimes.120 The delay in prosecution has also caused a 
 
 110 Id. at 10–11.  
 111 See id. at 11. 
 112 Zero Conviction of Rapists, Extortionists, and Killers, PAK. OBSERVER (June 28, 2014), 
http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=245651; see also Azam Khan, Zero-Conviction Rate For Rape: 
Senator Proposes Constitutional Changes, EXPRESS TRIB. (June 30, 2014), http://tribune.com.pk/story/728949/ 
zero-conviction-rate-for-rape-senator-proposes-constitutional-changes [hereinafter A. Khan, Zero-Conviction 
Rate For Rape]. 
 113 See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN ISLAMABAD, supra note 106, at 12. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id.; see also Nearly 1,000 Pakistani Women Killed for Honor, AL ARABIYA NEWS (Mar. 22, 2012), 
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/22/202385.html (describing the number of Pakistani women and 
girls murdered in honor killings after the implementation of the PWA). 
 117 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN ISLAMABAD, supra note 106, at 12. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 13. 
 120 Id. 
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problem in the effective administration of the law, resulting in as many women 
in prison while awaiting trial as actually convicted.121 This delay not only 
causes an overcrowding of penitentiaries, but also a violation of womens’ 
rights to justice.122 It is for these reasons that even with the implementation of 
the PWA, Pakistan has failed to provide any adequate form of relief to its rape 
victims. With the lack of efficient training methods and investigative 
procedures culminating in zero rape convictions since the implementation of 
the PWA, rape victims in Pakistan should be afforded other means of redress. 
III. THE STATUS OF RAPE AS A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
The PWA has not become the cure-all it was intended to be when it comes 
to the protection of rape victims in Pakistan.123 Despite its intended purpose, 
rape victims still suffer from a lack of adequate procedure and investigation, 
misinformation about their rights, and the possibility of being punished under 
the old system the new law was intended to eliminate.124 With such lack of 
redress afforded to rape victims in Pakistan, the possibility of the persistent 
nature of unprosecuted rape in the country being classified as a violation of 
international human rights law seems to be a plausible adaptation to the 
standards previously recognized. 
A. Current Violations of International Human Rights Law 
International human rights gained its strongest push towards normalization 
with the United Nations’s (U.N.) adoption of the ICCPR in 1966.125 The 
ICCPR defined the basic civil, political and cultural rights to which all human 
beings are entitled.126 The ICCPR, in combination with the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), form the International Bill of 
Human Rights.127 
 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See supra Part II.C. 
 124 See id. 
 125 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 126 See generally id. See also International Human Rights Law, OFF. HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS., 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/internationallaw.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2016). 
 127 International Human Rights Law, supra note 126. 
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The Preamble of the ICCPR establishes the foundation on which the treaty 
is based.128 As a basic assumption of the ICCPR, all men and women have a 
birthright that cannot be alienated, entitling them to inherent dignity and equal 
rights.129 Article 2 of the ICCPR further defines the scope of the “equality” to 
be indiscriminate—especially in regards to “race, colour, sex, language, [and] 
religion . . . .”130 However, perhaps the most important language of Article 2 
comes from its description of the obligations of signing parties to the 
ICCPR.131 According to the Covenant, “[e]ach State party to the present 
Covenant undertakes . . . [t]o ensure that any person whose rights or 
freedoms . . . are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that 
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”132 
With the broad language used in Article 2’s call for an effective remedy, 
the ICCPR opens itself up to interpretations and expansions through differing 
court systems. The first area where an expansive approach can be taken is in 
Article 2’s limitation to provide an effective remedy only when the 
perpetrators are State actors. The language of the ICCPR stipulates that the 
violations must be committed by persons acting in an official capacity or 
through the authority of the State.133 Adhering to a strict interpretation of the 
language of the ICCPR would then prohibit sanctions against Pakistan for the 
failure to adequately prosecute rape allegations because few, if any, reported 
rapes have been recognized as actions committed under State authority.134 
In recent years, however, there has been a trend towards a broader 
interpretation of a State’s obligations to provide its citizens a remedy under the 
ICCPR.135 This expansive approach has begun to consider a State’s obligations 
in relation to non-state actors.136 In the landmark case, Velasquez-Rodriguez v. 
Honduras, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights declared that: 
 
 128 ICCPR, supra note 125, pmbl. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. art. 2. 
 131 Id. art. 2(3)(a). 
 132 Id.  
 133 Id.  
 134 A. Khan, Zero-Conviction Rate For Rape, supra note 112 (stating that ninety-three percent of the rapes 
occurring in the country were categorized as marital rape). 
 135 Juan E. Mendez, The 60th Anniversary of the UDHR, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1157, 1158–60 (2009). 
 136 SARAH FULTON, REDRESS, REDRESS FOR RAPE: USING INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE ON RAPE AS 
A FORM OF TORTURE OR OTHER ILL-TREATMENT 29–30 (2013), http://www.redress.org/downloads/ 
publications/FINAL%20Rape%20as%20Torture%20%281%29.pdf. 
CROFFIE GALLEYSPROOFS2 3/17/2016 9:06 AM 
582 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not 
directly imputable to a State (for example because it is the act of a 
private person or because the person responsible has not been 
identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not 
because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to 
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the 
Convention.137 
Therefore, according to Velasquez-Rodriguez, a State may incur 
responsibility for failing to prevent or respond to certain acts or omissions of 
even non-state actors.138 When applied in the context of Pakistan, the State’s 
obligations under the ICCPR, according to Velasquez-Rodriguez, require the 
State to enforce those basic human rights and perform due diligence, even if 
the perpetrators are non-state actors.139 In the last six years,140 Pakistan’s 
failure to convict in any of the more than two thousand rape cases brought to 
domestic courts141 demonstrates the State’s lack of due diligence in providing 
an effective remedy to rape victims in the country. Thus, under an expansive 
interpretation of Article 2 of the ICCPR.142 Pakistan’s failure to provide an 
effective remedy for its citizens constitutes a violation of a binding 
international covenant. 
The concept of an “effective remedy” also presents its own difficulties in 
interpretation. Articles 2143 and 14144 of the ICCPR both address what would 
constitute an effective remedy through very broad language. With those two 
articles being the only times that an effective remedy is mentioned in the 
ICCPR’s entirety,145 Article 14 only mentions the right to compensation in a 
fair trial146 and Article 2 simply stipulates to the very “existence of effective 
remedies.”147 The scope of an effective remedy, though explained through 
fairly general terms in the ICCPR, is given more context when viewed in light 
 
 137 Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 172 (July 
29, 1988). 
 138 Id.; FULTON, supra note 136, at 30. 
 139 FULTON, supra note 136, at 30. See generally Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, supra note 137. 
 140 Zero Conviction of Rapists, Extortionists, and Killers, supra note 112 (citing statistics from 2009-
2015). 
 141 A. Khan, Zero-Conviction Rate For Rape, supra note 112. 
 142 ICCPR, supra note 125, art. 2.  
 143 Id.  
 144 Id. art. 14.  
 145 See ANNE GALLAGHER, THE RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY FOR VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING IN 
PERSONS: A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 4 (2010). See generally ICCPR, supra note 125. 
 146 ICCPR, supra note 125, art. 14. 
 147 Id. art. 2. 
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of other international covenants. The European Convention, for example, 
defines effective remedy as “the right to access the court” as detailed through 
Articles 13148 and 41.149 Similar definitions can be found in Articles 1150 and 
25151 of the American Convention, which both recognize an effective remedy 
as a general right to legal and judicial protection.152 Thus, if interpretations of 
what could constitute an effective remedy are viewed in light of the definitions 
provided through other international covenants, an effective remedy under the 
ICCPR could reasonably be interpreted as providing access to judicial 
protection and a legal remedy. 
Article 2’s mention of the State’s duty to provide an effective remedy for 
its citizens, indiscriminate of gender,153 outlines the main point of contention 
between Pakistan’s obligations as a signatory to the ICCPR154 and the 
Pakistani Criminal Code in practice. Pakistan’s desire to adhere to Islamic law 
creates a disparity between the country’s obligations under the ICCPR and the 
State’s ideological duties in attempting to abide by both Sharia and the 
Qur’an.155 Whereas one calls for the equality of all people indiscriminate of 
gender, the other has historically recognized women as second-class 
citizens;156 whereas one calls for an effective remedy, the other has repeatedly 
failed to provide redress for rape victims.157 
By analyzing Pakistan’s obligations to all of its citizens through reasonable 
interpretations of the ICCPR, Pakistan’s consistent failure to prosecute and 
effectively try rape crimes within the country constitutes a violation of its 
obligations under Article 2 of the ICCPR.158 However, despite the ability and 
 
 148 GALLAGHER, supra note 145, at 4. See generally Council of Europe, European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Nov. 4, 1950, 
C.E.T.S. No. 5, http://echr.coe.int/Documents/convention-eng.pdf [hereinafter European Convention]. 
 149 GALLAGHER, supra note 145, at 5. See generally European Convention, supra note 148. 
 150 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art 1, Nov. 22, 1969, 
U.N.T.S. 123.  
 151 Id. art. 25. 
 152 Id. arts. 1, 25; see also GALLAGHER, supra note 145, at 4. 
 153 ICCPR, supra note 125, art. 2. 
 154 Pakistan has been a signing member of the ICCPR since April 17, 2008. UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-4&lang=en 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2016). 
 155 Jonathan Russell, Human Rights: The Universal Declaration vs. the Cairo Declaration, MIDDLE EAST 
CTR. BLOG (Dec. 12, 2010), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2012/12/10/1569/ (explaining that Saudi Arabia refused 
to sign the UDHR believing that it violated the Qur’an and Sharia law). 
 156 See supra Part I.C. 
 157 Zero Conviction of Rapists, Extortionists, and Killers, supra note 112. 
 158 See supra notes 130–37 and accompanying text. 
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practice of countries such as Pakistan failing to abide by their duties under the 
ICCPR,159 countries can and do avoid international sanctions by simply 
refusing to ratify the First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, discussed below. 
B. First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR 
The First Optional Protocol was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 
1966160 and was designed as an enforcement mechanism to investigate and 
prosecute violations arising under the ICCPR.161 Signatories to the First 
Optional Protocol on Civil and Political Rights subject themselves to an 
individual complaint procedure.162 The individual complaint procedure allows 
complainants alleging to have suffered systematic abuse without remedy from 
their domestic country, in violation of the ICCPR, to be investigated by the 
U.N. Human Rights Committee.163 The Human Rights Committee then 
examines and addresses the reports, and submits concerns and 
recommendations to the State in the form of concluding observations.164 
However, because of the authority this would give an international court over 
domestic laws, many countries, including Pakistan, are not signatories to the 
First Optional Protocol despite having ratified the ICCPR.165 Without having 
signed the First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, Pakistan is not subject to the 
individual complaint procedure, an avenue which, if available, would have 
allowed victims to present their complaints to the Human Rights Committee 
directly.166 
 
 159 See supra Part II.C (referencing Pakistan’s failure to prosecute rape crimes due in part to dualistic 
legal systems). 
 160 See ICCPR, supra note 125. 
 161 ICCPR, U.S. HUM. RTS. NETWORK, http://www.ushrnetwork.org/our-work/issues/iccpr (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2016).  
 162 Human Rights Committee, UNITED NATIONS OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2016). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, supra note 154 (providing an updated list of States, which 
does not include Pakistan, that have signed the First Optional Protocol). 
 166 See Human Rights Committee, supra note 162. The First Optional Protocol gives the Human Rights 
Committee the authority to investigate individual complaints and determine if violations have occurred in light 
of a party’s obligations under the ICCPR. Because Pakistan is not a signatory to the First Optional Protocol, 
victims are not entitled to submit complaints through the individual complaint procedure and as a result have 
no direct means to have Pakistan’s conduct investigated in light of its obligations under the ICCPR. Id.  
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IV. DIFFERENT AVENUES FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PAKISTANI RAPE CRIMES 
A. Possibility of International Pressure and Forced Compliance with the 
ICCPR 
Though it is a relatively new area of study,167 scholars have begun to take 
into account the potential impact of international pressure on human rights 
reform.168 In the past, consistent and persistent international condemnation has 
led to landmark success stories such as the abolition of apartheid in South 
Africa169 and the signing of multiple human rights treaties by China.170 The 
impact of international pressure, however, is dependent on several factors 
outlined in the book Conflict and Compliance by Sonia Cardenas, author and 
professor at Trinity College, known for her research discussing the intersection 
between international relations and human rights.171 
Scholars have described five relevant factors that can contribute to the 
degree of human rights compliance: (1) the existence of relevant international 
norms, (2) the material interests of a major power, (3) transnational network 
activism, (4) domestic allies in target States, and (5) domestic political elites 
who either view themselves as vulnerable or care about their reputations.172 In 
light of these five factors, when international pressure is considered as an 
option for the present situation in Pakistan, the chance for immediate success 
seems minimal at best. This conclusion is reached for two reasons. 
First, Cardenas emphasizes the importance of international pressure from 
countries that are ideologically similar.173 Therefore, for Pakistan to sign the 
First Optional Protocol or change its human rights practices regarding the 
treatment of rape prosecution, other countries with similar Islamic-based laws 
would have to persistently and consistently condemn the actions of Pakistan.174 
 
 167 See SONIA CARDENAS, CONFLICT AND COMPLIANCE: STATE RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS PRESSURE 17 (2007). 
 168 Id. at 18. 
 169 See Catherine Barnes, International Isolation and Pressure for Change in South Africa, 19 ACCORD 
36, 36 (2008). 
 170 SONYA SCEATS & SHAUN BRESLIN, CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, at vi 
(2012), http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%20Law/r1012_ 
sceatsbreslin. 
 171 See CARDENAS, supra note 167, at 17–36. 
 172 Id. at 25; see also SUSAN BURGERMAN, MORAL VICTORIES 4–5 (2001). 
 173 CARDENAS, supra note 167, at 18–20. 
 174 See id.  
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Because the Sharia laws are modeled after Islamic law,175 it is unlikely that any 
country whose laws also comply with Islamic law would condemn the actions 
of Pakistan. 
Second, international pressure is only a distant remedy because of the 
changes that Pakistan already attempted to make by enacting the PWA. The 
PWA was established almost entirely as a result of the fifth factor,176 
“domestic political elites who either view themselves as vulnerable or care 
about their reputations.”177 It was because of this feeling of political 
vulnerability that Pakistani leaders enacted the PWA in the first place.178 If 
international pressure would only bring the State to options which are facially 
in compliance with international human rights standards yet have failed in 
implementation, like the PWA, then it should be clear that international 
pressure that prompts political change out of fear could not lead to any 
formidable changes. 
Thus, for international pressure to incite any significant change to either 
force compliance with the ICCPR or create an effective mechanism to handle 
rape prosecutions in Pakistan, there would need to be consistent and persistent 
pressure from countries with similar ideologies. Anything short of that would 
produce a superficial solution resulting in a circumstance no different than that 
created by the PWA. 
B. A Transitional Justice Mechanism 
In terms of addressing claims that would arise under Article 2 of the 
ICCPR, a “new horizon” has been developing relating to struggles against 
impunity and the failure of governmental bodies to provide an effective 
remedy: a transitional justice system.179 
The transitional justice system concentrates on “the struggle against 
impunity” and specifically on the idea of a right to remedy under human rights 
law.180 Transitional justice programs are unique to each country taking into 
consideration the root cause of the underlying conflict, the identification of 
vulnerable groups, and the condition of the country’s justice system and 
 
 175 See supra Part I.A. 
 176 See supra Part II.A. 
 177 CARDENAS, supra note 167, at 25 (citing BURGERMAN, supra note 172); see also supra Part II.A. 
 178 See supra Part II.C. 
 179 Mendez, supra note 135, at 1163. 
 180 Id. 
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security sectors.181 The responsibility for running these transitional justice 
programs is entrusted to local and national actors with human rights 
institutions coming into play as a means of advancing public participation in 
the process and, when necessary, recommending implementation mechanisms 
or participating in the implementation.182 
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) helps to implement 
a variety of mechanisms geared at addressing the specific needs of a particular 
country in regards to humanitarian assistance.183 Depending upon the needs of 
the country, the ICTJ will use one of seven approaches: prosecutions, 
reconciliation, gender, memory, truth seeking, reparations, or vetting.184 For 
the purposes of achieving equality for the women of Pakistan and adequately 
prosecuting rape claims within the country, a gender-based model would likely 
be most beneficial. In a gender-based approach, the ICTJ would work with the 
country to develop a tribunal to address the specific gender patterns of abuse 
that affect women with regards to the justice systems in Pakistan including 
“entrenching impunity.”185 
A problem with this gender-based transitional model arises in the context 
of implementation in countries such as Pakistan in which gender inequality is 
such a persistent and fundamental norm. In countries where gender inequality 
is a pattern, seeking a remedy through transitional justice mechanisms for 
crimes involving gender-based violence (primarily sexual assault) creates a 
cumbersome task.186 The social stigma of reporting such crimes in combination 
with women’s exclusion from the public decisionmaking processes would 
make it challenging for Pakistani women in particular to fully utilize a 
transitional justice system under its current conception.187 
For a transitional system to be effective, not only must victims feel 
comfortable bringing claims to domestic courts, but the State must also do 
 
 181 U.N. Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary General, United Nations Approach to 
Transitional Justice 5 (Mar. 2010), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010 
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 187 See Palash Ghosh, India Has a Rape Crisis, But Pakistan May Be Even Worse, INT’L BUS. TIMES 
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something to show the victims that their perpetrators will not be set free. The 
ICTJ describes the success of the process as being reliant on “societies . . . 
confront[ing] the past in order to achieve a holistic sense of justice for all 
citizens.”188 This task may be somewhat more difficult in a country such as 
Pakistan, in which the rape prosecutions have been described as “often 
institutionalized and ha[ving] the tacit and at times the explicit approval of the 
state.”189 For such a country where rapes are unprosecuted, and victims either 
rarely report rape or are discredited when they do,190 the only way a 
transitional system could survive would be if local government and domestic 
courts were not involved. Having already failed to uphold its duty under 
Article 2 of the ICCPR and arguably showcasing its reluctance to seriously 
investigate and prosecute rape, the current status of rape in Pakistan has 
dictated not only the unwillingness of women to trust the government, but the 
unwillingness of the government to deliver an effective remedy to rape 
victims. “State institutions cannot earn public trust or operate with 
accountability where perpetrators continue to wield power; yet, attempting to 
remove these individuals from office or bring them to justice may destroy a 
nation’s fragile intermittent peace.”191 
V. BRINGING RAPE CLAIMS THROUGH NON-DOMESTIC COURT SYSTEMS 
While countries claim to uphold and abide by the human rights provisions 
set forth in the ICCPR, they consistently fall short.192 After failed attempts to 
adhere to the provisions of various human rights documents, States are met 
with little or no repercussions.193 This dichotomy between the theory of human 
rights implementation and practice is largely based on the sovereignty of States 
to handle affairs within their own borders.194 However, in countries such as 
Pakistan, where States claim to provide equal representation of the law to both 
men and women, commitments to upholding human rights are often made for 
political reasons rather than out of an intent to actually uphold the rights of 
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citizens.195 Leaders find it politically beneficial to declare their country’s 
commitment to human rights in order to hold favor with other foreign 
governments and gain popular support at home.196 “In order to hold 
governments to their declared commitment to human rights, it is essential to 
establish the principle that human rights violations are not matters within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of domestic courts.”197 
A. The Alien Tort Claims Act 
Because of the systematic and unprosecuted nature of rape crimes in 
Pakistan, the victims should be able to bring their claims to U.S. federal district 
courts through the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). The ATCA grants 
jurisdiction to U.S. federal courts over “any civil action by an alien for a tort 
committed in violation of the law of nations.”198 The United States is unique in 
that it is one of the only legal systems to extend jurisdiction over civil actions 
for damages.199 With this in mind, an expansion of the previous scope of the 
ATCA to adjudicate claims of rape outside the context of an armed conflict 
could present a likely and perhaps necessary possibility. 
B. ATCA and the Prosecution of Rape in Times of Armed Conflict 
The ATCA was not always viewed as a law for the promotion of human 
rights.200 It was not until the landmark decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala that 
U.S. courts were able to adjudicate human rights issues under the ATCA.201 
Dr. Filártiga and his daughter were both Paraguayan nationals living in the 
Eastern District of New York.202 Prior to moving to New York, Dr. Filártiga’s 
son had been murdered and tortured in Paraguay while in police custody.203 Dr. 
Filártiga brought a claim under the ATCA when he saw one of his son’s 
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 198 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (West 2012). 
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murderers walking the streets of Manhattan.204 A federal court in New York 
upheld Dr. Filártiga’s wrongful death claim and further noted that torture by a 
State actor is a violation of international law.205 Filártiga opened the door for 
scores of ATCA cases to be filed against individual actors who had fled to the 
United States.206 
It was not until 1995 in the case of Kadic v. Karadžić that the ATCA was 
used to afford a remedy to rape victims, though it was confined to the victims 
of “state-sponsored sexual violence” during an armed conflict.207 
In Kadic, two groups of victims from Bosnia-Herzegovina brought actions 
against the then president of the unrecognized Bosnian Serb Entity.208 The 
Plaintiffs brought their claim to a U.S. federal court alleging a violation of 
international law under the ATCA.209 They alleged under international law that 
they had been the victims of brutal rape, forced prostitution, forced 
impregnation, and torture at the hands of the Bosnian Serb Military.210 The 
court referenced Filártiga to reiterate the requirements to bring a claim under 
the ATCA: (1) an alien (2) suing for a tort (3) committed in violation of the 
law of nations.211 The first two requirements under the ATCA were easily met, 
meaning that the only question that the court had to consider was whether the 
atrocities committed against the Bosnians were a violation of the law of 
nations.212 In its final decision, the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit 
explained two important concepts in terms of adjudication under ATCA.213 
First, the court recognized that the ATCA does not confine its reach solely to 
State action.214 Second, the court held that State-sponsored sexual violence is a 
violation of the law of war and consequently a violation of the law of 
nations.215 Ultimately, the expanded interpretation of the ATCA in Kadic 
allowed victims of rape to bring forth claims against non-state actors in times 
of armed conflict. Because of the Second Circuit’s willingness to expand the 
scope of the ATCA to enable rape adjudication in times of armed conflict and 
 
 204 Id. at 878–79. 
 205 Id. at 889. 
 206 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (West 2012). See generally Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 876. 
 207 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 208 Id.  
 209 Id. at 237. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. at 236. 
 212 Id. at 238. 
 213 Id. See generally Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (West 2012). 
 214 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 215 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242. 
CROFFIE GALLEYSPROOFS 3/17/2016 9:06 AM 
2016] DUTY OR FAITH? 591 
against non-state actors,216 federal courts should also be able to adjudicate rape 
cases in times of peace against non-state actors, as discussed below. 
C. Recognition of Rape During Times of Peace Under the ATCA 
The atrocities of rape are not unique to the circumstances under which they 
occur. Whether committed in the context of an armed conflict or during times 
of peace, the nature of rape does not change. Currently, one major distinction 
between the systematic use of rape during an armed conflict and those 
occurring in Pakistan is that victims of rape committed during an armed 
conflict have a chance to seek remedy under the ATCA. However, for the 
purposes of international law, it is not the emotional toll on the victims that the 
courts use to classify the crime. Rather, courts rely on its effect in relation to 
the laws of war to determine that in such a context, systematic and mass rapes 
encouraged and committed by a country’s government are unacceptable.217 
Thus, in order for rapes committed outside of an armed conflict to be classified 
as a violation of international law, international courts would have to recognize 
that persistent yet unprosecuted sexual violence in a country is a violation of 
jus cogens absent an armed conflict.218 
Thus far, when rape has been prosecuted on an international scale, U.S. 
federal courts have accepted the claims under a theory that the rape was “state-
sponsored” because it occurred under the color of authority or actual authority 
of the government. However, if federal courts were to broaden the current 
understanding of “state-sponsored sexual violence,” a country’s persistent 
failure to prosecute rape219 could fall within the meaning of “state-
sponsored.”220 While recognizing the actions of Pakistan’s government as 
“state approval” is a large expansion of the holding in Kadic, it is not an 
implausible interpretation of the standard in international law. 
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D. Future Difficulties in Allowing State-Sponsored Rape Claims Under the 
ATCA 
If U.S. federal courts were to expand upon the concept of “state-sponsored 
sexual violence,” perhaps the biggest problem would be the potential volume 
of cases brought. Despite the unlikelihood of having their claim effectively 
investigated, a large number of Pakistani women still brought claims to their 
government in an attempt to seek justice.221 Without investigations, the 
government has failed to convict anyone of rape since the implementation of 
the PWA.222 Further, authorities estimated that those thousands represented 
only a fraction of the crimes that actually occurred.223 It would be unrealistic 
for the U.S. federal court system to overextend its own resources in order to 
afford redress to all foreign nationals through the ATCA based solely on the 
grounds that the State had persistently failed to prosecute rapes within the 
country. Thus, if expanded, the courts would need to implement a certain 
minimum standard that would classify a case as being “state-sponsored.” This 
simple action would eliminate the ninety-three percent of the cases that were 
reported involving marital rape224 and even further limit the cases in which the 
State had either no involvement or no knowledge. This would, however, leave 
open the federal court system to the victims whose rape was either 
inadvertently endorsed, committed by law enforcement officials, or 
encouraged by tribal leaders and left unprosecuted by the Pakistani 
government.225 
Another substantial difficulty would be naming the proper defendant after 
bringing suit under the ATCA. Due to Pakistan’s failure to prosecute the 
crimes and the suit being brought under a theory that the activity was State-
sponsored, naming Pakistan as a defendant would seem to be the easiest and 
most likely choice. However, due to the basic sovereignty that States are 
afforded to handle matters within their own borders,226 it would be an 
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improbable circumstance for the federal courts to bring the suit naming 
Pakistan as a defendant. The most likely defendants for these cases alleging 
State sponsorship would be Pakistani officials. Under a theory of the ATCA 
that mandates a somewhat rigorous standard for recognizing State-sponsored 
sexual activity, it would only make sense that those who sponsored the activity 
be held responsible. This responsibility, depending upon the circumstance, 
could fall on either religious leaders,227 leaders in law enforcement, or heads of 
State that deliver tacit approval for the actions of rapists in their country. 
Holding leaders responsible would encourage the Pakistani government to 
fully investigate rape crimes, leading to a more effective prosecutorial 
system.228 
E. Likelihood of Success 
While the suggested limitations229 would make trying rape during 
peacetime under the ATCA more plausible, that Pakistani leaders will be tried 
in a U.S. court for their failure to prosecute rape crimes is still unlikely under 
the current laws. Protection of human rights, specifically the protection of 
women and women’s rights, has not yet risen to the level of international 
acceptance necessary to compel the intervention of foreign governments. 
However, if the law continues to develop along gender lines as it has done in 
recent years,230 trying rape during peacetime as a violation of international law 
under the ATCA could be a distant likelihood. To establish a more plausible 
scenario in which Pakistan’s actions could be considered a crime worthy of 
prosecution under the ATCA,231 two crucial elements would need to be 
satisfied. First, there would need to be a stronger emphasis on women’s rights 
as an international norm. Second, the international community would need to 
accept and recognize that rape is atrocious under any circumstance. With these 
normative developments, holding Pakistan accountable for its failure to 
provide an effective remedy for rape victims could eventually become a 
reality. 
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CONCLUSION 
The situation in Pakistan presents itself as the age-old struggle between 
duty and faith. The competing values of the Pakistani government, in 
attempting to adhere to their obligations under both international conventions 
and culturally-engrained Islamic ideals, have created a circumstance in which 
rape victims consistently lose. Pakistan’s feigned attempts at satisfying their 
international obligations and creating a more secular legal system are 
embodied by the PWA—a law that has consistently fallen short of carrying out 
its principal purpose of defending women’s rights. 
The implications of these shortcomings, while technically violations of 
Pakistan’s obligations under the ICCPR, have resulted in virtually no backlash 
from the international community. Unless Pakistan signs the First Optional 
Protocol of the ICCPR, there is little the international community can do to 
provide redress to victims short of working with Pakistan to implement a 
transitional justice system or condemning Pakistan for failing to abide by its 
obligations under the ICCPR. While a transitional justice system could be 
implemented in Pakistan, because of the Islamic ideals that govern the country 
in combination with Pakistani women’s lack of access to the governmental 
processes, it would have little chance for success.232 The same could be said of 
the possibility that international pressure could impact the current human rights 
situation in Pakistan. Without pressure from countries whose laws and faith are 
based on Islamic ideals (an unlikely circumstance), Pakistan’s reaction to 
international pressure would be minimal at best.233 
If redress for rape victims in Pakistan cannot be sought through domestic 
channels, then international law should develop in a way that would allow 
victims to obtain a remedy through non-domestic legal systems. As the law 
currently stands, no court system has recognized rape during peacetime as a 
violation of the law of nations. However, U.S. federal courts have come closest 
to this concept with the trying of rape committed in times of armed conflict as 
a violation under the ATCA. 
To consider Pakistan’s consistent failure to prosecute rape committed 
during peacetime as a State-sponsored action, and thus a violation of the law of 
nations, the law would have to develop in a number of ways—beginning with a 
change in the views of the international community towards women and 
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women’s rights. Without a stronger foundation admonishing violations of 
women’s rights in the international community, violations such as those in 
Pakistan will not prompt any immediate action to provide redress. The law 
would also need to recognize that rape is atrocious regardless of the 
circumstances in which it occurs. If such developments were to occur 
throughout the international community, rape committed during peacetime in 
Pakistan could be considered a violation of the law of nations worthy of 
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